Events Leading up to and Contributing to the Precipitation of the Crisis
The State of the Canal
The events which contributed most by far to the Suez Canal Crisis were those surrounding the nationalization and closure of the canal. In 1949, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in blatant contradiction to the terms of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many argued that this action also constituted a violation of the Rhodes armistice agreement.[8] Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, speaking before the United Nations Security Council declared:
There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement.[9]
In August, 1951, British Foreign minister Sir Anthony Eden declared that Egyptian liberty to close the canal implied Israel's right to traverse the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba, since these two conditions were "contingent and reciprocal" in the armistice agreement between the two nations.[8] Indeed, his argument persuaded many in the international community; on September 1, 1951, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 95, which called the closure of the Suez Canal "an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure" and an "unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another," and called upon Egypt "to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and good through the Suez Canal."[10] Under this pressure, Egypt eased its restrictions on travel through the canal. However, it gradually reimposed them the following year.[8]
Although the United Kingdom had gained control over the canal under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Egypt declared this treaty null and void in 1951. By 1954 the United Kingdom agreed to pull out of the canal zone.[5] On July 26, 1956, Egypt announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company,[11] in which British banks and business held a 44% stake. This nationalization was done in order to raise revenue for the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. The United States and Britain had previously agreed to help pay for this project, but cancelled their support after Egypt bought tanks from communist Czechoslovakia, and extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.
Eden tried to persuade the British public of the need for war and so, perhaps in an attempt to recall World War II-era patriotism, he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler twenty years earlier. However, the very first comparisons between 1930s dictators and Nasser during the crisis were made by the Labour Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell and the left-leaning tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror. Eden had been a staunch opponent of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and he claimed that a display of force was needed to prevent Nasser becoming another expansionist military threat.
Arab Economic Pressure on Israel
In order to pressure Israel, the Arab world commenced a series of economic sanctions against it in the early 1950s. Amongst other actions, Israel's neighbors all but sealed their borders, and thoroughly severed all forms of transportation and communication across them. The Arab world closed its ports to Israeli shipping, as well as to ships originating from or destined for Israeli ports. This action made shipping to Israel almost unfeasible, since Israel would have to be the only stop in the region for a ship which anchored there. All flights departing from, landing in or passing through Israel were forbidden from passing over Arab air space. Individuals who had an Israeli visa in their passport were refused entry into Arab countries. Arab governments also pursued a campaign designed to dissuade private companies from doing business with Israel, and put a good deal of pressure on other governments to participate in their embargo. In July, 1950, Egypt passed a law requiring that the captains of ships passing through Egyptian ports guarantee that their cargo was intended for local consumption at their port of immediate destination. These restrictions were designed to prevent such cargo from being shipped to Israel from neutral ports. While all these measures had some effect on the Israeli economy,[12] Israel's economic growth nevertheless remained strong.[13]
Egyptian Arms Deal
In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser imported arms from the Soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:
Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel. ... There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.
Under the terms of this deal, Czechoslovakia sold Egypt 200 tanks, 150 artillery pieces, 120 MiG jet fighters, 50 jet bombers, 20 transport planes, 15 minesweepers, 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, hundreds of vehicles and thousands of modern rifles and machine guns. Although the arms were to be delivered promptly, Egypt paid for them over the span of twelve years with shipments of cotton to the Soviet bloc. This volume of arms was unlike any the Middle East had ever seen, and it was coupled with the sale of 100 tanks, 100 MiG fighters and hundreds of other items to Syria, as well as the provision of Soviet and Czechoslovakian trainers and assistance personnel. This sudden change in local balance of power pressured Israel to act quickly, and acted as a catalyst to the Suez Canal Crisis.[14]
Egyptian Influence in the Arab World
Nasser's apparent role in the dismissal of British military leader Glubb Pasha in Jordan prior to the canal company nationalization had greatly annoyed British Prime Minister Anthony Eden.
The French were befouled by Nasser's support for Muslim insurgents in French Algeria. Similar to the British, the French news called Nasser a "dictator".
Anglo-Franco-American Diplomacy
The Free World Allies opened a discussion on August 1st, with a tripartite meeting at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Affairs Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau [15]
Soon an alliance was formed between Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, with headquarters based in London. Chief of Staff was made of General Stockwell and Admiral Barjot. The United Kingdom sought cooperation with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with what it maintained was a threat of Israeli attack against Egypt, to little effect.
Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the tensions that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences were organized to secure agreement on canal operations; all were ultimately fruitless.
Meanwhile, France used its secret connection with Israel, which was the only option for British-French joint intervention, even though the United States nuclear umbrella was deactivated. [16]
Protocol of Sèvres
Three months after Egypt's nationalization of the canal company, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for an alliance against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, instructing that both the Israeli and Egyptian armies withdraw their forces to a distance of 16 km from either side of the canal. The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and that it need be placed under Anglo-French management.
The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest she lose access to the remains of her empire. France was nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on her North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France were eager that the canal should remain open as an important conduit of oil. Israel wanted to reopen the canal to Israeli shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen her southern border and to weaken a dangerous and hostile state.
Prior to the operation Britain deliberately neglected to take counsel with the Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli. This proved to be a fatal miscalculation for the colonial powers.
Fedayeen
In the summer of 1955 Egypt began using fedayeen to conduct a proxy war against Israel. These units—often trained and equipped by Egypt—would infiltrate across what was then the Israeli-Egyptian border at Gaza, and conduct guerilla raids against Israeli targets. These raids contributed to Egyptian-Israeli tensions during this time.[17]